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Essays on Unemployment and 
Labor Supply
Arash Nekoei
Understanding the determinants of individuals’ partic-
ipation in market-base production is the focus of the three 
essays presented here.
Chapter 1 attempts to address a fundamental question that 
has not been resolved by the existing literature: Does unem-
ployment insurance (UI) induce a simple delay in job accep-
tance as the unemployed enjoy subsidized leisure? Or do the 
unemployed use additional benefits to actively improve their 
job opportunities, so that subsidizing a longer search results 
in a better job? These questions have significant implications 
for our understanding of unemployment and the design of 
unemployment insurance.
Contrary to standard search model predictions, prior stud-
ies fail to estimate a positive effect of UI on reemployment 
wages. Chapter 1, coauthored with Andrea Weber, addresses 
this puzzle in two steps. First, it estimates a positive UI wage 
effect by exploiting an age-based regression discontinuity 
in Austrian administrative data. Second, it shows that these 
empirical estimates can be reconciled with search theory 
once our model incorporates duration dependence. In fact, 
in such a setting, the UI wage effect is determined as the 
balance between two offsetting forces: UI causes agents to 
seek higher-wage jobs but also reduces wages by lengthening 
unemployment. This implies a negative relationship between 
the UI unemployment-duration and wage effects, which 
holds empirically both in our sample and across studies, 
reconciling disparate wage-effect estimates.
Connecting these results to a normative model of UI 
points to an overlooked welfare benefit: UI increases future 
tax revenue through higher wages. We show that this positive 
fiscal externality is of the same order of magnitude as the 
traditional negative moral-hazard externality emphasized in 
prior work. These results suggest that taking into account 
gains in job quality could significantly change the optimal 
generosity of UI.
 Chapter 2 offers a dynamic view of unemployment, 
which allows us to study the separation of workers from 
firms as well as their hiring. In my framework, layoffs stem 
from temporary wage rigidity and noncontactable produc-
tivity shocks. Using an optimal allocation approach, I show 
that the optimum allocation is realized when employers 
internalize not only the direct cost of layoff, i.e., expected 
UI benefits, but also two additional costs: 1) the uninsured 
cost of layoff due to moral hazard, which takes the form of a 
Pigovian tax; and 2) the increase in the unemployment rate 
due to lower effort from workers. These results shed some 
light on our understanding of UI tax design.
Chapter 3 offers a close look at the household labor 
supply decisions, in particular, how price shocks can affect 
the labor supply of its members. The chapter examines this 
question by exploiting exchange rate variations as exogenous 
price shocks to immigrants’ budget constraints. This helps to 
answer the following question: Are an immigrant’s decisions 
affected in real time by her home country’s economy? I 
find that in response to a 10 percent dollar appreciation, an 
immigrant decreases her earnings by 0.92 percent, mainly by 
reducing hours worked. The exchange rate effect is greater 
for recent immigrants, married immigrants with absent 
spouses, Mexicans close to the border, and immigrants from 
countries with higher remittance flows. A neoclassical inter-
pretation of these findings suggests that the income effect 
exceeds the cross-substitution effect. Remittance targets offer 
an alternative explanation. 
Chapter 1
Do Unemployment Benefits Improve  
Job-Match Quality?
(coauthored with Andrea Weber)
The great recession, accompanied by soaring unem-
ployment rates, has brought UI back to the center of public 
attention. The debate rages on about whether generous UI 
programs provide a remedy or exacerbate the problem. 
Program proponents point out the value of insurance against 
income loss from layoff and long-term unemployment, while 
opponents cite a robust empirical finding in labor economics: 
UI reduces the incentives for job search and increases jobless 
durations.
A key factor missing from the current debate has been  
the effect of UI on job-match quality. According to the theory 
of job search, UI prolongs jobless durations for two reasons: 
1) agents spend less time and effort looking for a job, and  
2) agents become more selective in the type of job they seek. 
The latter channel implies that access to unemployment 
benefits may help job seekers find better jobs. In the past, 
however, UI proponents were cautious to make the case for a 
positive effect on job quality, since “the evidence here is very 
thin” (Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 2005, p. 211]).1 In fact, 
until very recently, most of the available estimates of the 
unemployment benefit effect on job quality, mainly measured 
by wages, were not significantly different from zero (Card, 
Chetty, and Weber 2007; Lalive 2007; Van Ours and  
Vodopivec 2008). 
Evidence for Positive Effects of UI on Job Quality 
Chapter 1 demonstrates empirically that access to more 
generous UI does indeed lead to agents finding better jobs. 
Moreover, it explains why previous studies had a hard time 
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identifying this effect. In particular, it exploits a quasi- 
experimental design to study the effects of an extension of 
the potential unemployment benefit duration on job search 
outcomes, using 19 million job separations recorded in Aus-
trian administrative data.
Consistent with prior research, Chapter 1 estimates that an 
increase in potential benefit duration causes workers to stay 
jobless longer. But in contrast with previous studies, we find 
that the benefit extension also causes workers to find jobs 
that pay, on average, 0.5 percent higher wages. Moreover, the 
positive wage effect persists over time and does not substi-
tute any other desirable job characteristics.
Investigating the mechanisms driving the positive effect 
of UI on wages, we find that it results from an attenuation 
of wage declines between pre- and postunemployment jobs. 
In particular, access to more generous benefits reduces the 
likelihood of experiencing a wage loss that is larger than 
40 percent and increases the likelihood of achieving a wage 
increase between 0 and 10 percent.
Exploiting the matched employer-employee component of 
the Austrian data, we also investigate whether unemployed 
workers benefitting from UI either find jobs in higher-paying  
firms or find better-paying jobs in an average firm. Our results 
show that UI helps job-seekers move toward “better” firms: 
they find jobs in larger firms with higher proportions of male 
and older employees, which typically proxy for a higher 
bargaining power of workers. Most importantly, we document 
that these unemployed workers are moving to firms that, on 
average, pay higher wages to their other employees.
Folk Wisdom 
Consider two popular explanations for unemployment. 
According to the first explanation, unemployment is due 
to randomness in job search.2 The second one argues that 
randomness is not an issue, but that the mismatch between 
workers’ skills and firms’ demand for skills creates unem-
ployment. In this world, unemployed workers have to wait 
for a suitable vacancy to open or acquire necessary skills for 
available vacancies.
UI subsidizes job search in either scenario because it 
gives unemployed individuals more time to sample job offers 
or prepare for the right vacancy. Following this argument, UI 
should raise jobless durations and, at the same time, increase 
job quality. Additionally, it also subsidizes leisure so that 
agents may delay starting an accepted offer, which would 
lead to agents lowering their effort with no effect on job 
quality. Folk wisdom can thus explain positive or zero effects 
of UI on job quality.
Folk Wisdom is Incomplete 
Contrary to folk wisdom, the effect of UI on subse-
quent job-match quality is not necessarily positive, as it is 
determined by two offsetting forces. On the one hand, UI 
increases agents’ selectivity, which in turn has a positive 
effect on job quality. On the other hand, UI raises jobless 
durations and may thus reduce job quality, as job opportuni-
ties decline over the jobless spell. This decline in job oppor-
tunity over time can be caused by multiple factors, such as 
loss of human capital, stigma, screening by employers, or 
diminished savings.3 
If we assume that job seekers are rational and forward 
looking in their decisions, how can a more generous unem-
ployment benefit lead to a lower subsequent job quality? 
This is theoretically possible, as agents care about well-being 
or consumption rather than just the earnings when they are 
employed. It can be shown that UI creates a wedge between 
the two and can thus reduce wages, although it always 
increases consumption.
A Reconciliation of Empirical Findings 
A large body of existing empirical work has not found 
any effect of UI on job quality. For instance, three prominent 
papers that use quasi-experimental designs and adminis-
trative data provide estimates of UI effects on wages that 
are not significantly different from zero (Card 2007; Lalive 
2007; Ours 2008). Moreover, there is recent evidence of a 
statistically significant negative wage effect for Germany 
(Schmeider, von Wachter, and Bender 2013), while the evi-
dence discussed above finds a positive effect for Austria.
These different empirical findings do not contradict theory 
once we take into account duration dependence, meaning 
that the job seeker’s opportunities and skills deteriorate 
the longer she remains out of a job, while at the same time 
unemployment benefits decrease. We show that a job search 
model incorporating duration dependence can reconcile the 
contrasting empirical estimates of the effect of UI on job 
quality.
Moreover, the model highlights a potential source of 
heterogeneity that drives empirical estimates, namely, 
the relative importance of search effort vs. selectiveness 
in determining the job finding rate. This heterogeneity is 
reflected in a negative correlation between the effect of UI on 
jobless durations and its effect on job quality. We show that 
the negative correlation holds in a meta-analysis of existing 
estimates: studies that estimate stronger effects of unemploy-
ment benefits on jobless durations also tend to find smaller 
effects of benefits on job quality and vice versa.
Policy Implications 
As the UI system is designed to balance the value of 
insurance against job loss with the cost of extra taxes, an 
important policy question is, what is the optimal level of 
generosity of unemployment insurance? The conventional 
answer to this question has focused on the effect of unem-
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ployment benefits on unemployment durations. As insurance 
reduces the incentives of jobless agents to find a job, it raises 
aggregate benefit payments and creates higher taxes for the 
rest of the population. In the conventional model, this neg-
ative fiscal externality is balanced against the insurance or 
consumption-smoothing value of UI to determine the optimal 
benefit generosity.
However, if UI also affects job quality, it might change 
future tax revenues. The total fiscal externality of the pro-
gram should thus be calculated as the sum of the traditional 
negative externality from increased unemployment dura-
tions, and the externality from job quality, the sign of which 
depends on the sign of the effect of UI on job quality (and is 
theoretically undetermined).4 
In the Austrian case, the externality from job quality is 
positive and has the same order of magnitude as traditional 
duration externality, but with the opposite sign. Based on our 
theoretical insights and this empirical estimate, we conclude 
that the optimal generosity of UI varies depending on the 
relative importance of the effort versus selectivity margins 
in job search. These results suggest that taking into account 
gains in job quality could significantly change the policy 
recommendations regarding the optimal generosity of unem-
ployment insurance.
Chapter 2
The Design of Unemployment Insurance:  
Benefits and Taxes
Unemployment benefits increase unemployment spells by 
reducing a laid-off worker’s job search efforts or increasing 
her job selectiveness (e.g., reservation wage). Job search 
and selectiveness are both unobservable by the government. 
The resulting moral hazard creates a fiscal externality that 
should be balanced against the insurance of unemployment 
benefit. This trade-off has been the basis for the estimation of 
optimal unemployment benefits.
However, the layoff decision itself is affected by UI 
taxes levied on firms. The common understanding is that 
perfect experience rating is the optimal policy in this regard. 
Perfect experience rating means that firms pay the full UI of 
worker layoffs through higher taxes. The argument in favor 
of perfect experience rating originates in Feldstein (1976). 
The general insight is that an incomplete experience-rated 
UI system creates a cross-subsidy between firms and makes 
employers more likely to lay off workers and employees 
more willing to work in layoff-prone firms.5 This is due to 
the fact the firms and workers do not completely internalize 
the social cost of layoff.
In this chapter, we investigate this question and derive the 
condition under which such intuition holds. The main feature 
of the model is two asymmetry of information: unemployed 
agents’ efforts are not observable by planner, and firms’ lay-
off risks are not perfectly observable by agents.
In a simple static model, I show the trinity among full 
insurance, production efficiency, and perfect experience 
rating. Production efficiency is achieved with a Pigovian 
internalization such that a laying-off firm faces a marginal 
tax rate equal to the worker’s cost of layoff. Moreover, 
full insurance put unemployment benefit equal to this cost. 
Therefore, full insurance and production efficiency together 
imply that the layoff tax should be equal to unemployment 
benefit, i.e., perfect experience rating.
However, this intuition breaks down once UI does not 
completely insure the agents due to assymetry of informa-
tion (moral hazard problem) (Baily 1978). In this case, the 
employer needs to internalize not only the direct cost of 
layoff—that is, the expected unemployment benefit—but two 
extra costs: 1) the uninsured cost of layoff (a Pigovian tax), 
and 2) the increase in the unemployment rate due to lower 
effort from workers. The latter stems from the fact that the 
idea of optimality of perfect experience rating is based on the 
direct fiscal externality created by a layoff (higher taxes on 
others), whereas the indirect externality (higher layoff rate 
creates a behavioral response among unemployed workers) 
is ignored.
Furthermore, we show that the layoff tax depends on the 
degree of layoff-risk observability at the time of job search. 
For example, in a world with no insurance, if the layoff risk 
is unobservable, then layoff tax is positive due to uninsured 
layoff cost. However, optimal layoff tax is zero in the other 
extreme, where layoff risks are completely observable—as 
in this case, wages are fully compensating agents for layoff 
risks.
The main result of the chapter is the optimal unemploy-
ment benefit and taxation formula. I develop an optimal UI 
taxation formula that depends on the degree of insurance of 
unemployment benefit (moral hazard) as well as the degree 
of compensation of layoff risk by firms (which depends on 
the observability of layoff risks). Second, I show that the 
Baily-Chetty-type formula for optimal unemployment benefit 
level holds independently of UI taxes.
This chapter lies at the intersection of three research 
strands. First, there is a four-decades-old debate about the 
role of experience rating in the U.S. labor market. Feldstein 
(1976) focuses on the effect of experience rating on tempo-
rary layoffs. In his model, firms are facing demand shocks 
and have an exogenous number of attached employees, in the 
sense that they do not search jobs elsewhere when unem-
ployed. The main result is that incomplete experience rating 
leads to an excess of temporary layoff. Albrecht and Vroman 
(1999) examines the consequences of experience rating in an 
efficiency wage model where layoff is caused by workers’ 
heterogeneity. They find that, in the presence of experience 
rating, firms pay higher wages in order to avoid layoffs, and 
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thus some degree of experience rating is part of the optimal 
policy.
Several papers find empirical support for this prediction, 
and they generally attribute a substantial share of tempo-
rary layoffs to incomplete experience rating.6 Anderson and 
Meyer (2000) analyze the reintroduction of experience rating 
in Washington State in 1984. Their findings suggest that 
industry average tax rates are largely passed on to workers, 
but much less of the difference between firm’s tax rate and 
the industry average rate (see also Anderson and Meyer 
[1997]).
The second strand of literature is closely related to the 
first one but directly focuses on a layoff tax. Layard (2005) 
observes that an increase in layoff costs has an ambiguous 
impact on unemployment: it reduces both job creation and 
job destruction.7 Mandatory firing costs can help employers 
to promise credibly not to cut wages in low-profitability peri-
ods if layoff risks are unobservable (Karabay and McLaren 
2011).8 
The third related strand of literature attempts to estimate 
the degree of compensating differentials for unemployment 
risk. Topel (1984) finds the first evidence of compensation 
for anticipated unemployment risk. The level of compensa-
tion decreases with UI generosity.9 Specifically, he estimates 
a wage premium of about 1 percent for each point of unem-
ployment when unemployment benefit replacement rate is 50 
percent. More recently, several papers revisited this question 
(e.g., Magnani [2002] and Moretti [2000]). In particular, Ruf, 
Lalive, and Zweimuller (2006) estimate a firm-component 
of layoff risk in spirit of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 
(1999). They then show that firms compensate workers for 
this component. However, the effect is quite small and con-
fined to temporary layoffs. Del Bono and Weber (2008) use 
variation in the starting month of seasonal jobs as a predictor 
of anticipated unemployment. They find that employers pay, 
on average, 11 percent higher wages for seasonal jobs.
The closest paper to this work is Blanchard and Tirole 
(2008). They consider the design of a UI system with taxes 
and benefit. In a simple static framework, they offer intu-
itions on how several unrealistic assumptions are necessary 
for the perfect experience rating to be optimal. One of the 
unrealistic assumptions is the full insurance. This chapter 
addresses (to some extent) the “challenge” they suggest in 
this regard, which is “to extend the research on optimal UI, 
which focuses on the optimal size and timing of benefits . . . 
to a model where the destruction margin is endogenous” (p. 
53). Furthermore, the assumption of complete unobservabil-
ity of layoff risk in Blanchard and Tirole (2008) is relaxed, 
which becomes important in the design of the UI system.
Chapter 3
Immigrants’ Labor Supply and Exchange  
Rate Volatility
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5(4): 
144–164, 2013.
Are an immigrant’s decisions affected in real time by 
her home country’s economy? We might expect this to be 
the case, given the substantial amount of remittances they 
transfer and their high rate of return. This chapter demon-
strates this effect by showing that an immigrant changes her 
labor behavior based on the purchasing power of her income 
in her home country. In particular, immigrants consider both 
the current home-country value of remittances as well as the 
future home-country value of their savings. This means that 
an immigrant’s intra- and intertemporal labor decisions are 
affected by her home country’s economy, in addition to the 
factors that influence native workers.
Empirical Findings 
This chapter explores exchange rate variation as exoge-
nous price shocks to the purchasing power of immigrants’ 
earnings. Using CPS March data for 1994–2011, I estimate 
the exchange rate elasticity of earnings to be −0.092, so that 
in response to a 10 percent appreciation of the U.S. dollar 
relative to a currency, an average immigrant from that coun-
try reduces her annual earnings by 0.92 percent. This implies 
that, for instance, a one-standard-deviation appreciation of 
the U.S. dollar relative to the peso reduces annual earnings of 
the average Mexican immigrant by 1 percent.
More than 60 percent of that earnings variation can be 
explained by changes in annual hours worked. Two-thirds 
of these changes (40 percent of all earnings variation) stem 
from changes in the number of weeks worked. For example, 
an average Mexican immigrant facing a one-standard- 
deviation depreciation of the peso relative to the dollar 
reduces her annual full-time weeks worked by 0.23 weeks, 
which are divided equally into part-time weeks and weeks 
off. All these exchange rate effects on labor supply do not 
differ significantly between female and male immigrants.
Consistently, the exchange rate effect is most pronounced 
for immigrants who are more likely to have close ties to 
their home countries. For instance, the effect is greatest for 
a married immigrant whose spouse is absent and least for 
an immigrant who lives with a spouse. Similarly, the effect 
is greater for immigrants from countries with higher remit-
tance flow. Mexicans, the largest immigrant group, are as 
responsive to exchange rate variations as other immigrants. 
Additionally, for those Mexicans living close to the Mexican 
border, the exchange rate effect is doubled.
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Intuitively, we would also expect that immigrants’ ties 
to their home countries weaken over time; that is, an immi-
grant’s amount of remittances and likelihood of return 
decrease as she spends longer time abroad. I define this 
concept as ‘disintegration’—a natural counterpart to the pro-
cess of assimilation à la Chiswick (1978). I offer suggestive 
evidence that an immigrant’s exchange rate effect decreases 
as she spends more time in the United States. As such, dis-
integration seems indeed to occur. However, the slow speed 
of disintegration means that U.S. immigrants remain at least 
somewhat sensitive to their home countries’ exchange rates 
throughout their lifetimes.
Theoretical Implications 
The sign and magnitude of the estimated exchange rate 
elasticity of earnings also sheds light on the characteristics 
of individual preferences. In a neoclassical framework where 
remittances enter household utility, exchange rate plays the 
role of the price of remittances. In this case, the sign of this 
elasticity implies that the income effect of exchange rate on 
earnings exceeds the substitution effect—that is, leisure is a 
gross complement of remittances.
To better understand the mechanisms behind the empir-
ical results presented, the exchange rate effect is analyzed 
using a collective model of the household. In such a setting, 
intrahousehold efficiency implies that exchange rate affects 
consumption and labor supply of immigrants only through its 
effect on remittances. Therefore, the negative exchange rate 
elasticity of earnings implies negative exchange rate elastici-
ties of remittances and consumption. The combination of the 
empirical findings and these theoretical results implies that 
an appreciation of the dollar leads immigrants to work fewer 
hours per week and fewer weeks per year, earn less per hour, 
consume more, and send fewer dollars home.
The relatively large income effect of the exchange rate 
is also consistent with an alternative explanation. Similar to 
Camerer et al. (1997), it can be interpreted in the context of 
reference-dependent preferences (here either target remit-
tances or target earnings). Given the persistent nature of the 
shocks in this setting, I argue that both neoclassical and ref-
erence-dependent preferences remain plausible explanations.
To interpret the magnitude of our estimate, I use a neo-
classical model, as well as a model with reference-dependent 
preferences. Broadly speaking, the magnitude of the esti-
mated elasticity is rather large relative to the existing litera-
ture. I argue that this may be due to the fact that this estimate 
is friction-free, as immigrants will choose relatively fewer 
labor and consumption commitments ex ante in expectation 
of frequent exchange rate shocks. In contrast, previous work 
has estimated frictionless elasticities using large, infrequent 
shocks that make it worthwhile for agents to pay the adjust-
ment cost ex post to overcome friction. The difference in 
magnitude between my elasticity estimate and the elasticity 
estimates generated by the large shock method is a matter for 
further empirical analysis.
This chapter lies at the intersection of two research 
strands, the first of which studies the determinants of remit-
tance flows. The existing literature has, for the most part, 
documented a set of correlations between various macro-
economic variables and remittance flows. In contrast, this 
chapter uses exchange rate variation as a set of exogenous 
shocks to the price of remittances, which affect the labor sup-
ply decisions of immigrants. This is closely related to Yang 
(2008), who exploits exchange rate variations to study the 
effect of changes in remittance flows on recipient families.
The second segment of related literature investigates the 
determinants of immigrants’ economic decisions. In partic-
ular, Fox and Stark (1987) study a small group of temporary 
Mexican workers in the United States from 1982 to 1983. 
They estimate a positive correlation between immigrants’ 
labor supply and the purchasing power of the dollar in 
Mexico. In comparison, the present study attempts to identify 
the causal relationship between the home-country economic 
situation and immigrants’ labor supply by comparing similar 
immigrants from different countries.
Notes
1. For examples of such policy recommendations, see Chetty 
(2010) and Council of Economic Advisers (2013). For anec-
dotal evidence of such a channel, see Lowrey (2013).
2. Randomness stems from sampling vacancies due to either the 
lack of information about them (random search models) or the 
lack of coordination among applicants (directed search models).
3. Many papers offer theoretical reasons for a negative duration 
dependence, and some offer supportive empirical evidence; 
Chapter 1 offers a discussion of this literature.
4. Following the literature on optimal unemployment benefits 
design, we neglect potential general-equilibrium effects of ben-
efits on nonrecipient workers. We provide supportive empirical 
evidence for this assumption in our setting in Chapter 1.
5. For empirical evidence for the latter, see Deere (1991).
6. For instance, Topel (1983) and Card and Levine (1994) use 
variation in experience rating across states, and Anderson and 
Meyer (1994) follow the same methodology, in addition to 
using variation in unemployment insurance tax at the firm level. 
Saffer (1983) provides an alternative approach using variation 
in marginal layoff tax across industry. Furthermore, the relative 
size of industries in a state seems to be affected by UI system, 
and in particular by the subsidies implicit in incomplete expe-
rience rating (Deere 1991; Testa 1989). For empirical evidence 
on cross-subsization through UI taxes, see Anderson and Meyer 
(1993), Becker (1972), and Munts and Asher (1981).
7. See also Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, 1999) and Millard 
and Mortensen (1997).
8. Several papers attempt to measure the effect of layoff taxes 
on permanent layoffs. The best examples are studies using 
the introduction of layoff tax for elderly workers in some 
European countries (Behaghel 2008; Hakola and Uusitalo 2005; 
Schnalzenberger 2009). Most importantly, Hakola and Uusitalo 
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(2005) study a reform in the Finnish pension system and find 
that an increase in the cost of laying off elderly workers by one 
year of earnings reduces the layoff probability by 1 percentage 
point.
9. For prior work that found minor find negligible and often 
negative compensation for unemployment risk, see Abowd and 
Ashenfelter (1981, 1984); Bronars (1983); and Hamermesh and 
Wolfe (1990).
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